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Abstract
Scholarship on intelligence studies suffers 
three key limitations: 1) it fails to grasp that the 
knowledge- production of agencies is value-laden 
and thus political in itself; 2) scholarship disre-
gards most of the non-English speaking world 
and 3) focuses nearly exclusively on foreign intel-
ligence. I suggest that these limitations are due to 
a broader theoretical poverty of intelligence stu-
dies, and present three concepts through which 
a richer analysis may emerge: 1) »security« in 
the sense of understanding the meaning of secu-
rity that intelligence agencies use as a basis for 
operating; 2) »secrecy« to investigate the concrete 
measures that agencies use to create and manage 
secrecy and 3) »bureaucracy« to investigate the 
day-to-day work done by the bulk of intelligence 
employees. These concepts turn the gaze towards 
the concrete, institutional processes of intelli-
gence production, rather than towards abstract 
models such as the intelligence cycle, which do-
minate current scholarship. Intelligence studies 
needs to borrow from the rich tradition of orga-
nizational sociology and critical IR to develop a 
more thorough understanding of what intelli-
gence agencies actually do, and what their effect 
on international politics is.
Introduction
On the sixth of June, 1975, Erich Mielke, East 
Germany’s State Security Minister, received a let-
ter outlining the request that members of Egypt’s 
intelligence agency receive training from the Sta-
si on the »conspiratorial opening and closing of 
doors, cupboards, safes, etc.«. Mielke hand wrote 
»Approved!« on the document, thus paving the 
way for the Egyptian agents to be received for 
training in autumn 1975 at a Stasi foreign intelli-
gence service site.1
Thirty-five years later, on the seventh of May, 
2015, two days ahead of the first state visit to Ger-
many by the new Egyptian president Abdel Fatah 
Al-Sisi, an article appeared in Berlin’s newspaper, 
Der Tagesspiegel, detailing the range of training 
that Egyptian agents would receive that year 
at German police and security institutions (Ge-
hlen et al., 2015). Throughout 2015, the ministry 
would host six workshops for Egyptian intelli-
gence agency and police officers, at a cost of over 
EUR 100,000. In addition, agents of Egypt’s State 
Security Agency would receive on-the-job train-
ing during the final match of Germany’s national 
football league on the thirtieth of May, working 
alongside their German counterparts. Eventual-
ly, several Egyptian agents would work-shadow 
for several months at Germany’s national police 
agency (ibid.).2
As these two anecdotes highlight, relations 
between Germany and Egypt’s intelligence agen-
cies3 have been long-standing, and have contin-
ued across borders of time, space, and politics 
(Krieger 2013). One would imagine that this ex-
change over the decades would have attracted 
1 MfS, Main Department A, Memorandum, 6th June 1975, 
in BstU, OTS, Nr. 1534, pp. 134-135. 
2 In April 2017 the German government formalised its se-
curity cooperation with Egyptian police and intelligence 
agencies, signing an extensive formal security cooperation 
agreement (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017). 
3 There is no clear terminology about intelligence agen-
cies. They may be referred to as intelligence agencies, intel-
ligence institutions, secret services, or security services. In 
this article, I primarily use the term »intelligence agency« 
without attributing to this phrase an a priori definition as 
intelligence agencies can take on a variety of forms. 
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the attention of international relations scholars. 
However, this has not been the case. Hardly any 
knowledge exists about the international relations 
and inter national activities of Germany or Egypt’s 
intelligence agencies, and academic analyses are 
practically non-existent.4 
The lack of IR research into intelligence agencies 
has been repeatedly remarked upon since the mid-
1980s, and still, today, the situation continues (An-
drew, 2004; Der Derian, 1993; Fry and Hochstein, 
1993; Hastedt, 1991; Krieger, 2004). The theoret-
ical poverty of intelligence studies is frequently 
mentioned (Gill et al., 2009). In this article, I argue 
that these two lacunae are related. IR research is 
sorely required into the vast and politically signif-
icant international activities of intelligence agen-
cies. However, for this research to take place, a 
number of significant theoretical shortcomings of 
existing intelligence studies need to be challenged. 
Several deep-seated and wrong-headed assump-
tions about the raison d’être, the functioning, and 
the political importance of intelligence agencies 
make it difficult for theoretically interested IR 
scholars to engage in intelligence research. This 
is so because firstly, they need to explain to a the-
oretically myopic audience (composed of intelli-
gence scholars) why the existing shortcomings are 
important and secondly, because they then have to 
confront a theoretical and conceptual void. There 
are very few shoulders to stand on (Van Puyvelde 
and Curtis, 2016).
Still, the time has long arrived to take up the 
question: what is the relevance and meaning of in-
telligence agencies in modern international rela-
tions (Collado Seidel, 2013; Davies and Gustafson, 
2013)? This article, which is based on the early 
stages of a 5-year study of German and Arab intel-
ligence agencies’ international relations, outlines 
a research agenda by presenting the most glar-
ing gaps in existing scholarship, and by offering 
some theoretical considerations to inspire future 
study. I argue that to address intelligence agen-
cies’ international work, first, a new theoretical 
4 A significant, primarily descriptive literature exists on 
the East German services. A smaller, often semi-academic 
literature exists on the West German and Egyptian servic-
es. Both rarely comment on their international work.  Some 
examples include Sirrs, Owen, The Egyptian Intelligence 
Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2010, London: 
Routledge, 2011; Abu Al-Fadl, Abdalfatah, Kuntu Nāʼiban Li-
Raʼīs Al-Mukhābarāt, Cairo, Egypt: Dar El Shorouk, 2001; 
Krieger, Wolfgang »The German Bundesnachrichtendienst 
(BND): Evolution and Current Policy Issues«, in: The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 790–805. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Dietl, Wilhelm, Deck-
name Dali: Ein BND-Agent packt aus, Köln: Eichborn, 2007; 
Gieseke, Jens, The GDR State Security. Shield and Sword of 
the Party, Berlin: BStU, 2002; Maddrell, Paul, »The Economic 
Dimension of Cold War Intelligence-Gathering: The West’s 
Spies in the GDR’s Economy«, Journal of Cold War Studies 
15, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 76–107.
and methodological approach to the relationship 
between modern states and their agencies is re-
quired. IR scholarship’s numerous innovations in 
the past two decades, including the integration of 
discourse theory, the »practice turn« (Bueger and 
Gadinger, 2015), the application of ethno graphic 
research (Vrasti, 2008) and critical security stud-
ies (Salter and Mutlu, 2012), offer a number of 
useful concepts and research methods that can be 
mobilised to develop interesting and effective re-
search questions.  
This article is split into three sections. The first 
section provides a literature review of existing in-
telligence scholarship. The second section analy-
ses three dominant limitations of this field, which 
are of particular relevance to IR. Thirdly, three 
concepts, through which a nuanced view of intelli-
gence agencies may emerge, are treated: security, 
secrecy, and bureaucracy.
Intelligence History and Intelligence Studies
The academic literature on intelligence agencies 
is broadly split into two related fields: intelligence 
history and intelligence studies (Fry and Hoch-
stein, 1993). Intelligence history is more strictly 
disciplinary, and most scholars active in this field 
are historians by training. Intelligence studies 
is more diverse, and contributing scholars come 
from a range of backgrounds, including a signifi-
cant number of those who are former practitioners 
(Phythian, 2017a, 2017b). 
Intelligence history, which has a strong base 
in the UK, Germany, and Austria5, is particularly 
focused on the development of European and US 
foreign intelligence during the two World Wars 
and the Cold War. A great variety of themes exist 
within these limited periods. Frequently, articles 
or books investigate the role of intelligence dur-
ing specific historical episodes. A typical example 
of an article title may read: »Operation TIGRESS: 
deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 
1952 atomic test« (Dylan, 2015). Broader themes 
treated by intelligence history are, for example, 
the international cooperation of allied intelligence 
agencies, the comparative study of the activities of 
one intelligence agency in different fields of oper-
ation, or, more rarely, the comparison between the 
behaviour of different intelligence agencies dur-
ing particular historical episodes (Aldrich, 2009; 
Davies, 2002; Farson et al., 2008). 
Assessing the value of specific operational meth-
ods during historical events is an important area 
of inquiry. Significant moments of intelligence 
failure are another recurring theme, especially 
concerning the recurring problem of faulty com-
5 Two important European institutions are the Interna-
tional Intelligence History Association based in Würzburg, 
Germany and the Centre for Intelligence, Propaganda, and 
Security Studies at Graz University, Austria. 
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munication between intelligence institutions and 
political decision makers. More recently, a small 
literature on the topic of national intelligence cul-
tures has emerged, somewhat analogous to the 
literature on strategic cultures, which histori cally 
investigates whether different countries have de-
veloped distinctive cultures regarding their in-
telligence communities (de Graaf and Nyce, 2016; 
Phythian, 2014). What quickly becomes clear is 
that in terms of the larger and smaller events ana-
lysed, intelligence history is closely related to top-
ics of interest to international relations scholars: 
the focus is nearly always on matters of interna-
tional politics and/or international conflict. 
Intelligence history scholars much less frequent-
ly consider the history of intelligence agencies that 
exists before 1914 and after 1990 (Iordanou, 2016: 
306–7). The extreme case of intelligence failure 
surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq is an impor-
tant exception, which has been considered from 
many angles. How was it possible for UK and US 
leaders to distort intelligence knowledge without 
facing any significant opposition from within the 
intelligence community? Why did European intel-
ligence agencies possess so little, and indeed, con-
tradicting information about the crucial matter of 
Iraq’s weapons programmes? Why was the existing 
information not processed or shared among allies? 
Was the root of the problem a communications fail-
ure between intelligence agencies and the execu-
tive branch? Was the lack of Arabic language skills 
to blame, or were their analytic skills deficient? 
Here, we can already see how intelligence history 
overlaps with the more contemporary themes of in-
telligence studies discussed further below.
The more limited literature dedicated to the 
history of intelligence agencies before 1914 main-
ly considers either the development of modern 
European intelligence agencies since the 18th 
century, or the role of intelligence in different 
empires during antiquity. One noteworthy arti-
cle on espionage in early modern Europe during 
the 16th and 17th centuries by the Spanish liter-
ary scholar Diego Navarro Bonilla makes a fasci-
nating exception (Navarro Bonilla, 2012). Bonilla 
convincingly argues that the small, not yet fully 
territorialised states of early modern Europe al-
ready included elements of the institutionalisation 
of intelligence agency work. Bonilla writes: »...the 
political theory of the modern state that originat-
ed in the fifteenth century offers fertile ground 
for connections between state theory and secret 
information«. He adds that interestingly, in 16th 
century Venice (one of the early European states 
with significantly developed domestic and foreign 
intelligence institutions), the term for ambassa-
dor was »spia onorata«, the ›honourable spy‹ (ibid: 
285, on early institutionalisation of intelligence in 
Venice also see Iordanou, 2016). 
The development of Europe’s intelligence agen-
cy bureaucracies from 1850 onwards is marked by 
a rapid growth of documentation, files, papers and 
technical instruments, which have been the focus 
of some study (Kafka, 2012; Vismann, 2000). How-
ever, existing scholarship is largely descriptive 
and fails to analyse this process in the context of 
the growth of the European territorial nation state 
as such. The work by the German historian Wolf-
gang Krieger is an important exception that draws 
on very rich historical research to make crucial 
theoretical observations about the relationship 
between the bureaucratisation of surveillance, 
and modern, national rule. Krieger convincingly 
argues that the development of today’s near-to 
ubiquitous professional and bureaucratic intelli-
gence agencies is closely linked to the demands 
and dynamics of modern warfare and government 
over increasingly connected, eventually nationally 
defined populations and territories (Krieger 2009: 
13–14, 118–135).
Also of note is the well-developed literature on 
the contemporary history of French intelligence se-
curity and intelligence agencies, which comprises 
historical works (Faligot and Kauffer, 2013; Faure, 
2004) that nevertheless venture into political and 
sociological analyses of the relationship between in-
telligence and modern states and societies (Dewerpe, 
1994; Laurent, 2009).
Studies of medieval and antique writings on es-
pionage, surveillance, and rule focus on a few key 
texts. Sun Zu’s famous The Art of War about war-
fare in 5th Century BC China, or the Arthashastra, 
a text about government in 2nd century BC India, 
may serve as examples (Musco, 2016; Ramachan-
dran, 2014; Warner, 2006). These antique treaties 
analyse the creation of secret knowledge and the 
value that this knowledge may hold for an absolute 
or feudal ruler. Here, the arrival at secret knowl-
edge and its use is highly personalised, as is the 
relationship between ruler and spy. Thus, a key 
question analysed by these ancient texts is what 
types of spies exist, what motivates spies, and how 
different types of spies may be most effectively 
treated and handled. The highly differing social 
and political context in which these texts were cre-
ated puts into question their applicability and use 
for contemporary international relations schol-
ars. Yet, on occasion, some of these insights from 
pre-modern history provide theoretical inspiration 
for understanding the contemporary relationship 
between the work conducted by intelligence agen-
cies and state power. For example, the Italian po-
litical scientist Stefano Musco writes about a me-
dieval Persian text from 11th century BC, which 
emphasises the close link between the ability to 
rule over a certain territory and being able to ex-
tend one’s information networks across it (Musco, 
2016). This insight can be traced back to ideas of 
rule developed in the antique Middle East, writes 
4ZMO Working Papers 23 · Sophia Hoffmann · Why is there no IR scholarship on intelligence agencies? · 2019
Musco. Its relevance for contemporary IR is quite 
clear: the continuing efforts of governments to ex-
tend their information and surveillance networks 
into all types of existing space (which today, of 
course, goes far beyond classic understandings of 
state territory to include air and satellite space) 
demonstrate that surveilling a territory contin-
ues to be closely linked to ruling it (Johnson et 
al., 2017).
Intelligence studies, the more contemporary- 
oriented branch of intelligence scholarship, de-
veloped during the 1980s. The 1984 edited volume 
The Missing Dimension by two historians of mod-
ern diplomacy was a clarion call for contemporary 
historians to (re)consider the role of intelligence in 
contemporary diplomacy and warfare (Andrew and 
Dilks, 2014). Intelligence Studies’ flagship journal 
Intelligence and National Security appeared in 1986, 
and was founded by British historian Christopher 
Andrews and the US Professor of Naval Strategy, 
Michael Handel.  These two authors’ interests con-
tinue to reflect the journal’s interdisciplinary focus 
on historical studies and more theoretical analyses 
of contemporary intelligence work that is conduct-
ed mainly in the US and UK (Johnson, 2016).
Contemporary intelligence studies scholars con-
sider the assumption that intelligence work con-
sists of a cyclical process,  termed »the Intelli-
gence Cycle«, to be one of their main theoretical 
achievements (Phythian, 2013). This cycle consists 
of five steps: (1) The planning and directing of intel-
ligence needs by political decision makers; (2) the 
collecting of intelligence; (3) the processing of in-
telligence; (4) analysis; (5) and its dissemination to 
decision makers – who then set the cycle in motion 
again after reassessing intelligence needs. A large 
part of intelligence studies literature is dedicated 
to, or is at least somehow linked to, the Intelligence 
Cycle, and is particularly concerned with the ques-
tion of how its separate steps can be made more 
effective. The monumental 2012 Oxford Handbook 
of National Security Intelligence, for example, con-
tains one chapter for every step of the cycle (as well 
as chapters dedicated to other topics) (Johnson, 
2012).
Often, intelligence studies focus on how to im-
prove the efficiency and effectiveness of the work 
of (mainly US and UK) intelligence agencies. 
Within this shared aim, there are a huge variety 
of problems to be addressed and solved. Scholars 
regularly address technical challenges or oppor-
tunities regarding data-analyses, visual analyses 
or software innovations and their implications for 
intelligence collection or analyses. Others focus 
on the organisational difficulties that intelligence 
institutions frequently fail to address, including a 
problematic work culture or competition between 
different agencies with possibly overlapping man-
dates. Ethical questions are discussed, such as 
the tension between secret intelligence work and 
democratic oversight, or the euphemistic debate 
(»enhanced interrogation techniques«) around the 
CIA’s use of torture during the war on terror.
Despite an intensive debate among leading 
scholars, no generally accepted definition of »in-
telligence« has emerged (Lowenthal, 2011; Her-
man, 1996; Warner, 2002; Gill et al., 2009; Kahn, 
2001). I only mention this here, as the search for 
this definition dominated a significant part of 
the intelligence studies literature for some time, 
though in the past decade interest in this question 
appears to have waned. »Intelligence« remains an 
ambiguous term, at least in the English language, 
and a central theory of what it is does not exist. 
Is intelligence more than information? Is it a pro-
cess or a product? Is intelligence necessarily se-
cret? Moreover, does it necessarily emerge from 
state activity, or is all information of relevance to 
senior decision makers considered intelligence? 
The response to such questions have resulted in 
divided opinions, even though much of this debate 
may simply be linked to the linguistic oddity that 
in English, systematic surveillance is mysteriously 
called ›intelligence‹, rather than ›information‹ or 
›news‹ as in French or German (Farson, 1998: 52). 
From a qualitative and critical perspective, any 
attempt to define in a few words the institution-
alised, bureaucratised and highly professionalised 
work of intelligence agencies, appears, in any case, 
misplaced, or at least much less important than ar-
riving at an understanding about what this work 
means for the exercise of state power. For the sake 
of completeness, the following examples illustrate 
this nevertheless significant debate in the intelli-
gence studies literature. Michael Warner, one of 
the leading US intelligence scholars and a former 
in-house historian for the CIA, defines intelligence 
as »secret, state activity to influence foreign en-
tities« (Warner 2002: 16). Peter Gill, one of the 
leading British intelligence scholars developed the 
following definition: intelligence is »mainly secret 
activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissem-
ination and action – intended to enhance security 
and/or maintain power relative to competitors by 
forewarning of threats and opportunities« (Gill, 
Marrin and Phythian 2009: 214). 
Three significant limitations of intelligence 
literature
Intelligence scholarship suffers from three signifi-
cant and interrelated limitations. All of these are 
ultimately connected to the fact that practically all 
theoretical work done on intelligence agencies has 
been conducted from a functionalist, neo- realist 
perspective, which suffers from well-known the-
oretical and methodological limitations. In the 
following, I try to spell out how these three limi-
tations have obstructed a more empirically groun-
ded, critical analysis of intelligence agencies as a 
source and an effect of state power, before con-
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tinuing with some suggestions as to how such a 
critical analysis could be developed.  
Intelligence agencies as professional  
knowledge-providers
Most existing intelligence scholarship character-
ises intelligence agencies as neutral functionari-
es that, if working correctly, enhance state pow-
er by providing accurate and timely information 
to decision-makers.6 ›Working correctly‹ is here 
understood as efficient and professional, both in 
terms of managerial effectiveness and in terms 
of accurate implementation of clearly defined in-
telligence procedures. Much of the literature is 
devoted to developing working methods and stan-
dards to achieve this, while ignoring the process 
of knowledge production, which is implied to be 
value neutral and dependent on technical variab-
les (Rønn and Høffding, 2013). The small number 
of published articles, which critically examine the 
way intelligence agencies’ knowledge production 
is based on certain values and reproduces a pre-
supposed reality, have arguably failed to achieve a 
lasting impact, and the standard view in the field 
remains that »intelligence organizations provi-
de objective assessment to decision-makers who 
may otherwise be (mis)guided by their own jud-
gements« (Phythian 2012). From this standpoint, 
intelligence knowl edge becomes comparable to 
other institutions of social enquiry, as illustrated 
by the following quote from an article investiga-
ting the epistemic status of intelligence: 
»Our claim that intelligence is knowledge does 
not necessarily entail that intelligence work 
ought to be more academic or scientific. It mere-
ly recognizes that the inquiries already taking 
place within intelligence are no different than 
that of other scientific domains« (Rønn and 
Høffding, 2013). 
6 Exceptions exist, of course, and some of them are dis-
cussed throughout the following sections. Exemplary, rich 
conceptualisations of secret services and/or of their work 
include: Eickelman, Dale F., »Intelligence in an Arab Gulf 
State«, in: Roy Godson (ed.), Comparing Foreign Intelligence, 
Virginia, USA: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defence 
Publishers, 1988, pp. 89–114; Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. »An in-
sight into the mindset of Iraq’s security apparatus«,  Intelli-
gence and National Security 18, no. 3 (September 1, 2003), 
pp. 1–23; Sassoon, Joseph, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: 
Inside an Authoritarian Regime, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011; Aldrich, Richard and John Kasuku, »Es-
caping From American Intelligence: Culture, Ethnocentrism 
and the Anglosphere«, International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2012); 
Cormac, Rory and Richard J. Aldrich, »Grey Is the New 
Black : Covert Action and Implausible Deniability«, Inter-
national Affairs 94, no.3 (2018), 477-494; Gieseke, Jens, Die 
DDR Staatssicherheit Schild und Schwert Der Partei, Bonn, 
Germany: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2000.
From an empirically informed understanding 
of knowledge production within intelligence agen-
cies, it is highly problematic to simply consider it, 
in the abstract, as akin to any other scientific do-
main, or indeed to characterize it as scientific at all. 
Yet doing so makes it easy to consider intelligence 
agencies as objective power-enhancers and/or risk 
mitigating factors, which is precisely the dominant 
conceptualisation in the literature. Jennifer Sims, 
one of the few international relations scholars to 
deeply engage the study of intelligence, developed 
the concept of »decision-advantage« to illustrate 
the neo-realist understanding of what intelligence 
agencies do for states (Sims 2010). By providing 
accurate information about other states, especial-
ly about things that these states would prefer to 
keep secret, intelligence agencies furnish their 
executive with a decision-advantage over those 
leaders, who do not have this secret information 
(and who do not know that others possess it). Espe-
cially militarily weaker states, so the assumption 
goes, are able to compensate their weakness via 
effective use of intelligence agencies (Sims, 2002, 
2010).
Focus on the Anglo-Saxon world
A 2016 content analysis of around 2000 acade-
mic articles on intelligence demonstrates the 
literature’s overwhelming focus on the Anglo- 
Saxon world: 70% of all articles studied the intel-
ligence agencies of the USA or the UK (Van Puy-
velde and Curtis, 2016). The remaining 30% were 
primarily focused on Russia or the Soviet Union, 
Germany and Israel (ibid). In fact, the literature’s 
convergence is so complete that a 2013 edited volu-
me about intelligence agencies across the world is 
simply titled »Intelligence Elsewhere« (Davies and 
Gustafson, 2013). The editors of this volume pose 
obvious, but neglected questions of high relevance 
for international relations scholars: what explains 
differences between the intelligence agencies of 
different states? They answer their own question 
by arguing that these differences can be explai-
ned in reference to distinct intelligence cultures, 
which arise from a state’s specific historical and 
social characteristics.
The idea that distinct intelligence cultures exist 
that are analogue to the more developed concept 
of strategic cultures, has taken some root in the lit-
erature. Leading intelligence scholar Mark Phyth-
ian suggests conducting comparative studies of 
intelligence cultures and makes explicit reference 
to strategic culture as a model (Phythian 2014). 
Phythian presents several variables that could be 
used to frame such comparative study: strategic 
environment, regime type, organisational form, 
and social embeddedness (Phythian 2014: 30-33). 
Based on these assumptions, intelligence agencies 
can be compared according to the solutions they 
find to their mutual problems and institutional 
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constellations. Phythian argues that it is precise-
ly such an anchored, systematic comparison that 
prevents explanations of the differences between 
intelligence cultures from falling back on ethno-
centric arguments. 
Yet, this perception can be critiqued by argu-
ing that in fact, our knowledge about ›intelligence 
elsewhere‹ is so small that we simply cannot say 
with any certainty that intelligence agencies al-
ways face the same, or even similar, duties and 
challenges. If this is not the case, then why should 
culture or historical and social factors explain 
differences (and similarities) between agencies? 
Aldrich and Kasuku (2012) argue that the litera-
ture’s overwhelming focus on the Anglo-Saxon 
world has created highly biased perceptions about 
what intelligence agencies do; in many countries, 
for example, foreign intelligence is not the prima-
ry duty of agencies at all, but rather surveillance 
and repression of domestic opposition. Moreover, 
of course, such domestic surveillance is and has 
always been, also a job performed by Anglo-Saxon 
and European agencies, a fact that has been large-
ly ignored by intelligence scholars, possibly due 
to the taboo that long surrounded domestic sur-
veillance in democracies and which now, arguably, 
has been somewhat shattered. If one considers in-
telligence work globally, argues Aldrich, one finds 
that domestic work is just as important as foreign 
targeting. 
By ignoring ›intelligence elsewhere‹ the highly 
relevant question (for international relations schol-
ars in particular) about the relationship between 
regime-type and intelligence work has either been 
ignored or investigated according to highly biased 
assumptions. Does the role and work of intelli-
gence agencies fundamentally differ according to 
whether it is carried out within a democratic or 
dictatorial context? Or, is the difference rather 
one of degree (of violence, for example)?  In the 
late 1990s, the prominent intelligence scholar Pe-
ter Gill suggested a classification of domestic in-
telligence agencies and their governments, broad-
ly according to the idea that the more autonomous 
a domestic intelligence agency is, the more dicta-
torial its government. Here, the unaccountability 
of domestic intelligence agencies becomes a mea-
sure of the severity of a dictatorship. While this 
formula could, when turned around, function as an 
interesting research question (e.g., are the intelli-
gence agencies of dictatorships more autonomous 
than those of democracies?) without empirical evi-
dence, it remains no more than an assumption. 
In fact, from the perspective of internation-
al relations scholars, the entire categorisation of 
intelligence agencies according to their domestic 
governance (e.g. regime type) appears extremely 
limited. In this categorisation, the violence carried 
out by agencies within domestic space is essential-
ly what determines their categorisation as dicta-
torial and democratic. But what about the interna-
tional, or overseas activities of agencies? The fact 
that a number of very powerful democracies have 
used, and continue to use, their agencies for high-
ly violent activities abroad makes it misleading to 
simply categorise them as democratic, and thus 
as less violent and transparent (Austin, 2015). In 
addition, at least since the middle of the 20th cen-
tury, agencies of democratically governed states 
have regularly cooperated with their counterparts 
located inside dictatorships. Agencies from demo-
cratically governed states have been involved in 
the creation of agencies in dictatorship, and con-
tinue to support them with technology and exper-
tise today. This cooperation reached a depress-
ing low point when American, British and, in at 
least one case, German, agents interrogated and/
or tortured suspects held by foreign agencies in 
dictatorial states (Grey, 2007). The influence and 
work of domestic/foreign agencies do not end at 
the borders of their states. Rather, it can perhaps 
be argued, that intelligence agencies create a type 
of national and global governance that results in 
a fluid transition between, or layering of zones of 
democratic and dictatorial rule (Rejali, 2009). 
Focus on Foreign Intelligence
Related to the literature’s concentration on the 
Anglo-Saxon world is its excessive preoccupation 
with foreign intelligence, or rather its implicit as-
sumption that foreign intelligence is the first and 
foremost task of any intelligence agency. Most of 
the many definitions of intelligence discussed in 
the literature include a focus on foreign entities. 
Implicit in this definition, of course, is the assump-
tion that what intelligence agencies do, and why 
they exist, is to investigate and protect against the 
activities of foreign states and their citizens (or 
agents). While scholars regularly briefly mention 
other elements of intelligence agencies’ work, such 
as counter-intelligence and domestic intelligence 
gathering (referred to as »security services« in 
the English language literature), these are not the 
focus of most empirical research and are rarely 
mentioned in theoretical discussions. 
Intelligence scholarship has not caught up with 
including domestic surveillance into the core ac-
tivities of intelligence agencies everywhere. In-
stead, domestic intelligence work is still mostly 
considered as an anomaly, associated exclusively 
with authoritarian governments. For IR scholars 
in particular, the focus on foreign intelligence re-
sults in a number of significant research biases 
and gaps. The most important bias, perhaps, is that 
this focus emphasises that the intelligence agen-
cies of different states stand in a relation of sus-
picion or even enmity towards each other. It also 
de- emphasises the many ways that intelligence 
agencies either actively maintain international 
relations with each other, or simply share many 
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interests akin to what James Sheptycki’s work 
identified as a »transnational subculture« in the 
area of transnational policing (Sheptycki, 1998). 
Although the realisation that intelligence agen-
cies do indeed closely surveil each other points to 
the mechanisms through which they possibly de-
velop in each other’s mirror image (and thus de-
velop into a form of global governance), the focus 
on observing the foreigner/enemy has resulted in 
a blind spot to this fact (Maddrell, 2015).  In this 
way, much academic theorising about agencies con-
tributes instead to the production of a hegemonic 
idea about what intelligence agencies are, instead 
of investigating and analysing the relationship of 
this idea to material reality. 
Three concepts for a new approach to  
intelligence agencies
The following section introduces three concepts, 
which may offer interesting lenses through which 
an empirically rich and analytically interesting 
approach to intelligence agencies could be de-
veloped. The three concepts presented here are 
security, secrecy, and bureaucracy. These are, of 
course, only suggestions to stimulate thought and 
discussion, and many more interesting avenues of 
research exist. 
Security
Security is a well-established concept both in neo- 
realist and critical international relations theory, 
and the ways it has been developed in these tra-
ditions can be mined for intelligence research 
(Booth, 2005; Salter and Mutlu, 2012; Williams and 
McDonald, 2018). Most intelligence scholars, both 
historians and political scientists, proceed from 
the assumption that intelligence agencies exist in 
order to contribute to state security (Farson et al., 
2008; Johnson and Wirtz, 2014). However, is this 
indeed so, and what does state security actually 
mean when it is operationalised by intelligence 
workers? 
A debate exists within neo-realist paradigms 
about the relationship between intelligence agen-
cies and international or global security (Hastedt, 
1991: 64-65). Some scholars argue that in the case 
of very powerful states, intelligence agencies pro-
ject sovereignty beyond national borders, which 
may or may not have destabilising effects. In pur-
suing global goals, powerful states use secret oper-
ations to maintain or enhance their power (Wieck, 
2013: 150). Richard Aldrich calls this the exercise 
of hyperpower via intelligence work (Aldrich, 2013; 
Cormac and Aldrich, 2018). Numerous examples 
can be cited both for the stabilizing and destabiliz-
ing role of intelligence agencies. In the 1950s, the 
then US president Eisenhower resisted expand-
ing the US nuclear arsenal largely due to intelli-
gence work showing that Soviet weapons were not 
as dangerous as often assumed. During the 1962 
Cuban Missiles Crisis, the CIA informed the then 
US President Kennedy that Russian head of state 
Khrushchev’s aggressive attitude was not shared 
by other Soviet leaders. This information gave 
Kennedy the confidence to wait, rather than to or-
der Cuba’s immediate bombardment (Hitz, 2010: 
261). However, the Cold War also provides for the 
destabilizing effect of intelligence agencies, such 
as the downing in 1960, of a US spy plane that had 
entered Soviet air space in order to collect aerial 
intelligence (the famous U2 incident). Contempo-
rary politics also offers numerous examples for the 
destabilizing effect of agencies. One such incident 
is the fake vaccination programme mounted by the 
CIA in Pakistan to access bin Laden’s DNA (Shah, 
2011). Others include the surveillance of German 
leader Angela Merkel’s mobile phone by US agen-
cies (Appelbaum, 2013), and in the early 2000s, the 
provision of incorrect information to German in-
telligence agencies by the Iraqi informant »Curve-
ball«, which was used by the Bush administration 
to justify attacking Iraq in 2003 (Drogin, 2008). 
The cooperation of intelligence agencies, both 
via official and unofficial channels, may be con-
sidered a form of low diplomacy that allows states, 
which are formally at war or at odds, to work to-
gether (Aldrich, 2013). Here, intelligence agencies 
may help to maintain communication channels and 
contribute to finding diplomatic and peaceful solu-
tions to conflicts. The fact that intelligence reform 
is now frequently included into security reform 
projects in Asia and Africa also furthers this view 
(Bruneau and Dombroski 2014). On the other hand, 
intelligence agencies allow democratic states to 
secretly carry out undemocratic politics at home 
and abroad (Grey, 2007; Rejali, 2009). Thus, agen-
cies may actively undermine the very peace bonus 
that some scholars assume democracies carry.
The above debates do provide for some interest-
ing and underexplored avenues into the relation-
ship between international relations and intelli-
gence agencies. Yet, what remains utterly missing 
from the literature is an approach that takes se-
riously the manner in which intelligence agencies 
themselves (re)produce certain notions of security 
and insecurity. Only a tiny body of historical stud-
ies and memoirs provide some information as re-
gards to this question (Dietl, 2007; Juretzko and 
Dietl, 2005; Maddell, 2015). 
For example, Ibrahim Al-Marashi’s analysis of 
telegrams sent by regional Iraqi intelligence of-
ficers shows a remarkable standardisation of 
derogatory phrases applied to persons at the re-
ceiving end of state violence, be they civilians or 
fighters. Al-Marashi refers to this as the bureau-
cratization of language (Al-Marashi, 2003: 3). At 
the same time, state violence is minimised by de-
scribing, for example, house demolitions, or depor-
tations as purification or as necessary measures. 
Al-Marashi convincingly argues that this language 
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demonstrates the security apparatus’s obsession 
with criminalizing regime enemies while jus-
tifying its own, criminal violence (Al-Marashi, 
2003: 21). Applying some insights from critical 
security theory and taking into account some of 
my initial research results from the archives of 
the East German intelligence agency, I would ar-
gue that Al-Marashi’s analysis could be pushed 
further. The internal communication of the East 
German intelligence bureaucracy shows similar 
tendencies to use standardized derogatory terms 
for persons engaged in undesirable behaviour 
(e.g. traitor, for someone attempting to leave the 
country illegally), or euphemistic phrases for its 
own politically dubious activities (e.g. friendship 
activity for gifting weapons to a poorer state). 
While there has been no analysis of West German 
intelligence agencies’ language and my research 
has not yet extended this far, criminologists have 
shown similar tendencies in West German police 
rhetoric with regards to terror suspects (Kretsch-
mann, 2017). The question that arises is: why, if 
this communication is for internal purposes only 
and frequently marked top secret, is it necessary 
to use euphemistic and (often quite absurd) de-
rogatory phrases? For whom is this stilted lan-
guage? A second similarity that this brief com-
parison between Iraqi and German intelligence 
language shows is the repetitive use of ritualised 
forms of address, as well as ideological slogans. 
In both cases, officers and ministers address 
each other as »comrades«, the Germans sign off 
with »socialist greetings«, while the Iraqis en-
courage each other to »live long for the struggle«. 
Given the internal nature of the archived commu-
nication, it seems clear that the highly normative 
language was not intended to justify intelligence 
activities to potentially critical outside observ-
ers. Instead, the language probably served to re-
inforce a common perspective on contemporary 
politics among intelligence officers, to reassure 
each other of one’s shared loyalty, commitment 
and goals, and to teach a particular interpreta-
tion of what state security meant at this point in 
time and how precisely intelligence officers were 
expected to serve it. From this perspective, the 
main purpose of Iraqi and German intelligence 
agencies appears to go far beyond than »provid-
ing information to policymakers that may help to 
illuminate their decision options« (Johnson, 2010: 
3). Instead, the agencies emerge as sites where 
the meaning of state security is created and the 
link between linguistic security devices and con-
crete security practices is forged.  The fact that 
these activities are conducted within the para-
doxical situation of sanctioned secrecy sets them 
apart from similar processes within other state 
security institutions. It is to the puzzle secrecy 
poses that the next section turns. 
Secrecy
What is actually secret about intelligence agen-
cies? What effect can this paradox, that every-
one knows about their simultaneously secret 
existence, have? Some of the most interesting re-
search done on secrecy and intelligence is that of 
Louis Fisher, a specialist in US constitutional law. 
His work describes in detail the nitty-gritty legal 
procedures, through which the state-secret privi-
lege is actually upheld and fought over. Since 9/11, 
both the Bush II and the Obama administrations 
have heavily relied on, and extended, the use of 
the state secret privilege to protect what Fisher 
describes as »abusive, illegal and unconstitutio-
nal actions« by the US government (Fisher, 2016; 
Fisher, 2010). The legal precedent upon which US 
courts base the state secrets privilege is the 1953 
United States v. Reynolds case, in which three wi-
dows took legal action to access an army report 
into the plane crash that killed their husbands. 
Government officials claimed that the report con-
tained secret information relevant to national se-
curity. However, two lower courts ruled that the 
widows’ claim to a fair trial meant that the report 
should be checked at least »in camera« – e.g. by a 
judge. Eventually the Supreme Court ruled in the 
government’s favour, creating the key precedent 
used to justify state secrets today. When the air 
crash report was eventually declassified, it was 
discovered that the government had lied. The re-
port contained no information relevant to natio-
nal security, but it showed that army officials had 
been negligent with airplane security. 
Fisher’s research shows that the procedures 
through which intelligence agencies’ secrecy is 
created can be investigated, described, and ana-
lysed by looking at the (conflictual) practices that 
are mobilised in the process. His work provides 
excellent insights into the research methodo-
logies and theoretical questions required to de-
velop critical academic studies about the politi-
cal effect of secrecy. Arguably, for international 
relations scholars, his work is nevertheless too 
concentrated on the domestic situation of the 
US. Secrecy provides intelligence agencies with 
significant autonomy and produces a layer of in-
ternational relations that the discipline has yet 
to take into account. I mention here briefly only 
two fields of activity as illustration: firstly, in-
ternational trade, and secondly, the exchange of 
knowledge about surveillance and the pre-emption 
of unrest. Research of archival and public infor-
mation shows that German and Arab intelligence 
agencies were and are actively involved in the de-
velopment and trade of weapons and surveillance 
techno logy. In the public record, instances of 
such trade are frequently described as scandals; 
IR scholarship should acknowledge this trade as 
a standard aspect of intelligence agency activity 
(Buthmann, 2004; Deutscher Bundestag 12. Wahl-
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periode, 1994; Hippler, 1991; Naylor, 1999: 296–
332; Privacy International, 2016; Todd and Bloch, 
2003: 78-86). The East German Ministry for State 
Security, which ran a large, international weap-
ons trade of which the rest of the government had 
only minimal knowledge, is an extreme example 
(Buthmann, 2004).7 Interestingly for IR scholars, 
this intelligence- industrial complex involved a sig-
nificant number of West German agents and com-
panies, indicating that the West German govern-
ment, or at least its intelligence agencies, had good 
knowledge of this trade, which, on the Arab side, 
included customers and businessmen from Egypt, 
Iraq, Yemen and Jordan (Deutscher Bundes tag 12. 
Wahlperiode, 1994: 184). This under explored eco-
nomic aspect of intelligence work draws attention 
to how actors that are generally understood as po-
litical may indeed shape the economic dimension 
of international relations, as has been convincing-
ly argued by e.g. Laleh Kahlili (Khalili, 2017). 
Regarding the international exchange of knowl-
edge about surveillance and pre-empting (and 
repressing) unrest, there is plentiful evidence of 
the mutual exchange of knowledge between Ger-
man and Arab intelligence (and police) agencies 
about what population groups require special at-
tention or from which situations unrest may arise, 
about technological innovations in the field of 
surveillance, agent recruitment and anti-terror 
operations. This knowledge exchange takes place 
directly, via training, advisory and exchange pro-
grammes, as well as indirectly, via mutual surveil-
lance of each others’s operations and tactics. In 
both cases (trade and surveillance) German and 
Arab intelligence agencies engage in international 
activity, which, as it occurs relatively autonomously 
from other government policies, appears to form a 
separate layer of international relations outside of 
other state or market channels. Sanctioned secre-
cy, created via the accepted, limited government 
oversight of intelligence agencies, enables a whole 
set of international activity that currently remains 
outside the study of IR.
In addition to these examples of very concrete 
research into the activities of intelligence agencies 
enabled by the state-secret privilege there exists 
a long-standing philosophical and sociological in-
vestigation into the broader relationship between 
secrecy, the social word and state sovereignty (Al-
mond, 2003; Simmel, 1908; Warner, 2012; Weber, 
2002). For example, the German sociologists Georg 
7 This trade formed part of the so-called »commercial coor-
dination section«, created to raise foreign currency reserves 
for the GDR. The weapons trade was conducted primarily via 
the front company IMES and via a secret weapons storage 
facility near Rostock. In Germany, this trade has been quite 
well researched; however, not academically. There appear to 
be scarcely any English language sources on the topic. See 
for example http://www.ddr-wissen.de/wiki/ddr.pl?IMES_
GmbH for some online material in German.
Simmel and Max Weber analyse the role of secre-
cy in the social life of individuals (Simmel) and as 
an element of bureaucratic power (Weber) respec-
tively. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida in-
vestigated the ontological status of secrecy, and its 
relationship to sacred and thus sovereign knowl-
edge. A secret, argues Derrida, holds the promise 
of sovereignty, because its existence simultane-
ously holds the promise of revelation of truth, e.g. 
of sovereign knowledge. Secrecy thus appears to 
be essential for meaning and communication, be-
cause its end would mean the end of all questions 
and thus all meaning: nothing more could be said 
(Almond, 2003: 463). Ever since Derrida’s writ-
ings, a number of other philosophical works about 
the relationship between secrecy, truth and reali-
ty have appeared (Barbour, 2017). With regards to 
the study of intelligence agencies, this highly ab-
stract literature nevertheless provides important 
food for thought about the way intelligence agen-
cies may perform secrecy and how this contributes 
to maintaining the idea (or effect) of the state and 
its legitimate claim to sovereignty (Melley, 2012; 
Mitchell, 1991; Schlichte, 2004: 152–153; Schlichte 
and Migdal, 2005). Here, the performance of secre-
cy may serve as a constant performance of state’s 
assumed, untrammelled sovereignty – which Fou-
cault termed »the king’s head«, and which may not 
have been cut off as resolutely as he assumed (Fou-
cault et al., 2003; Neal, 2004).
Bureaucracy
Intelligence agencies are closely associated with 
bureaucratic organisation. As the captured files of 
the East German and Iraqi intelligence agencies 
show, their day-to-day operations were indeed in-
tensely bureaucratic (Al-Marashi, 2003; Sassoon, 
2011, 2014). US intelligence agencies, in 2010, pro-
duced an overwhelming 50,000 reports annually, 
meaning that many reports ended up being igno-
red (Priest and Arkin, 2010). Managing documents 
and files forms an enormous part of intelligence 
agencies’ work and it is surprising that this is not 
even remotely reflected in the academic literature. 
Using »bureaucracy« as a conceptual lens fo-
cuses attention on the practices of institutionali-
sation, which seem to govern the existence of mod-
ern intelligence agencies worldwide, at least to a 
degree (Hastedt, 1991: 63).  The sheer volume of 
information and persons that intelligence agencies 
need to manage creates a need for standardisa-
tion at every level. As a result, agencies produce 
templates, standard operating procedures, and 
guidelines for the movement of files, communi-
cation, hiring processes, and so forth.8 Here, the 
8 For example, the 1979 regulations manual of the Iraqi 
military intelligence agency contains 200 pages and speci-
fies detailed standard operating procedures, ranging from 
job descriptions for even minor roles, to instructions on how 
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well-known bureaucratic demands for efficiency 
and brevity are found: the use of curtailed lan-
guage and acronyms, the differentiation of profes-
sional roles, the uses of databases to eliminate hu-
man error, and the development of social profiles 
and categories. In this sense, intelligence agencies 
share many features of other state institutions. Yet, 
in other ways, the specific demands of intelligence 
work create inherent tensions to the bureau cratic 
mode. This is because human intelligence (e.g. the 
use of spies to harvest information) and to a lesser 
degree secrecy, requires the mobilisation of pre-
cisely those human elements that bureaucratic pro-
cesses attempt to eliminate: emotions, unpredict-
ability, risk, creativity, deceit, and charade.9 And: 
intelligence agencies serve an array of different 
masters pursuing contradictory goals: foreign min-
istries, which seek diplomatic solutions and cooper-
ation, the military which prepares for warfare and 
the destruction of the enemy, and ministries of the 
economy, which seek to improve industrial output. 
This should create institutional tensions that go be-
yond the much-studied complications that bureau-
cracies tend to develop everywhere. Finally, politi-
cal convictions (i.e., ideology) or at least patriotism 
has been and probably remains a very important 
factor shaping the work of agencies, adding a fur-
ther layer of intensely human behaviour to their in-
stitutional design.
Anthropology, sociology and increasingly in-
ternational relations have produced a fine body of 
work on how bureaucratic practices serve to mate-
rially implement the idea of the state (Bierschenk 
and de Sardan, 2014; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; 
Schlichte, 2015; Schlichte and Migdal, 2005; Shar-
ma and Gupta, 2006). Bureaucracies can produce 
state authority, including in contexts where nation-
al legitimacy is absent (Feldman, 2008; Piiparinen, 
2008). Bureaucratic files contain and reproduce 
on command vast and specific information about 
large numbers of people and thus serve to create 
to judge human sources, fill in and handle travel reports, or 
prepare ID badges – including template forms and pre-pre-
pared texts. MfS, Main Dept.HA I, Memorandum, 6th May 
1980, in BstU, Hauptabteilung (HA) I 13690, pp. 245-425. 
Similarly, the East German foreign intelligence branch 
Hauptverwaltung A (HVA) operated pre-printed question-
naires to be filled in with the personal data of persons about 
whom information was sought, included standardised cat-
egories for anything ranging from hair, skin or eye colour 
to language abilities, addresses and so on. MfS, Working 
Group (AG) Commercial Coordination, Summary Document 
for Mohamed Hasan, undated, in MfS, AG BKK 98/Teil 1 von 
2, pp. 44-48.  
9 An example of this tension is found in the above- 
mentioned personal data questionnaires of the Stasi. In one 
document, the standardised field »Occupation/Qualifica-
tion« states, in incredibly neat handwriting: »weapons- and 
drug trader, company owner« – a clash between the bureau-
cratic logic of assigning every person an »occupation«, and 
the human intelligence logic of seeking out precisely those 
people engaged in non-standard and exceptional activities.
a population upon which the state can intervene. 
On the other hand, bureaucracies also allow peo-
ple to participate in government and can create 
a group of loyal cadres (Eckert, 2014; Feldman, 
2008: 20). Finally, the form and circulation of files 
determines who can access information, how in-
formation is shared, and what kind of information 
receives priority or falls to the wayside (Kafka, 
2012; Vismann, 2000).
Approaching intelligence agencies through the 
lens of bureaucracy promises applicable and in-
teresting research avenues for IR scholars. They 
could deliver relevant insights into, for example, 
bureaucratic procedures that create privileged 
access to knowledge, whether such access affects 
employees’ loyalty to the state and whether com-
parable processes are at work in different states. 
Of similar interest could be the bureaucratic pro-
cesses through which domestic intelligence work is 
distinguished from foreign work and how, in these 
processes, different aspects of state sovereignty 
are reproduced. In this regard, there appears to 
be an interesting distinction between German and 
Arab agencies. While German foreign intelligence 
agencies were, and are, interested in collecting all 
kinds of general and specific information about 
the Iraqi state and society, Iraqi agencies in Germa-
ny have been closely focused on their own citizens.10 
Research that is nevertheless still in its early stages, 
has found not a single incident of a German citizen 
being handled as an informer for an Iraqi agency 
(in Germany), while the opposite case is relatively 
frequent. This appears to indicate that while Ger-
man foreign agencies operationalise an interven-
tionist understanding of German sovereignty, Ira-
qi foreign agencies rather function as an extension 
of domestic control over Iraqi citizens abroad (I 
emphasise that this research is still in its initial 
stages, and that no research has yet been conduct-
ed in Iraqi archives). 
Conclusion
The study of intelligence agencies promises im-
portant innovations to IR. Firstly, much remains 
to be found out about the material reality of what 
agencies actually do in the international: what are 
their (micro-)practices, how are information and 
personnel managed, how do agencies communica-
te with other actors, how do they acquire techno-
logy, what departments do they run and for what 
purpose? A sheer endless number of questions re-
main unanswered. Secondly, proceeding perhaps 
from this material reality, the study of more ab-
stract, but no less important questions promises 
rewarding insights: how do the actions of agencies 
construct domestic and international space? Do 
10 The only exceptions identified so far are cases, in which 
Arab governments want to identify German engineering 
companies willing to (illegally) sell embargoed goods.
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national cultures really determine the functioning 
of agencies? Or is it rather, that the particular 
knowledge that agencies produce about the inter-
national shapes its national culture? How do intel-
ligence agencies contribute to the way internatio-
nal relations function and are governed?  
In this article, I address the most glaring gaps 
in the study of intelligence by proposing a modest 
set of ideas that may galvanize IR scholars to take 
up the challenge. In addition, the article offers 
three methodological approaches, through which 
interesting, and empirically and theoretically rich 
research projects may develop: first, by looking 
at the way agencies contribute to and construct 
security, second, by studying the way secrecy is 
mobilized around intelligence agencies and third, 
by analysing how the bureaucratic practices of in-
telligence agencies intersect with the idea, effect 
and practice of state power. 
IR scholars need not be deterred by an assumed 
lack of material about intelligence agencies. Sub-
stantive amounts of documents are available in 
archives and in public record, and can be supple-
mented with interviews. Diverse language abili-
ties are indeed necessary to conduct comparative 
research of different agencies, and given the lack 
of secondary literature, intelligence research does 
require time and money. However, given the pos-
sibilities of breaking truly new ground in an area 
where little has been published, this should not 
pose too great of a challenge for the development 
of avenues into this exiting field. 
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